We prove that finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for constant and a particularly simple class of games: polymatrix, degree 3 graphical games, in which each player has only two actions.
INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium is the central concept in Game Theory. Much of its importance and attractiveness comes from its universality: by Nash's Theorem [17] , every finite game has at least one. The result that finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete, and therefore intractable [8, 4] casts this universality in doubt, since it suggests that there are games whose Nash equilibria, though existent, are in any practical sense inaccessible.
Can approximation repair this problem? Chen et al. [4] proved that it is also hard to find an -approximate Nash equilibrium for any that is polynomially small -even for two-player games. The only remaining hope is a PTAS, i.e. an approximation scheme for any constant > 0. Whether there is a PTAS for the Nash equilibrium problem is the most important remaining open question in equilibrium computation.
For a constant number of players, we are unlikely to prove PPAD-hardness since a quasi-polynomial time approximation algorithm exists [16] . We therefore shift our attention to * This research was supported by NSF grants CCF0964033 and CCF1408635, and by Templeton Foundation grant 3966. This work was done in part at the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing.
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Polymatrix games In a polymatrix game, each pair of players simultaneously plays a separate two-player game. Every player has to play the same strategy in every two-player subgame, and her utility is the sum of her subgame utilities. The game is given in the form of the payoff matrix for each two-player game.
Graphical games In a graphical game [15] , the utility of each player depends only on the action chosen by a few other players. This game now naturally induces a directed graph: we say that (i, j) ∈ E if the utility of player j depends on the strategy chosen by player i. When the maximal incoming degree is bounded, the game has a representation polynomial in the number of players and strategies.
Our results
We prove that even for games that are both polymatrix and graphical (for particularly simple graphs) finding anapproximate Nash equilibrium is intractable.
Theorem 1. There exists a constant > 0, such that given a degree 3, bipartite, polymatrix game where each player has two actions, finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
In previous works [4, 8] , hardness of Nash equilibrium in two-player games was obtained from hardness of a bipartite polymatrix game. Roughly speaking, the reduction lets each of the two players choose the strategies for the vertices on one side of the bipartite graphical game. This reduction incurs a polynomial blowup in the error -and indeed, as discussed earlier, we do not expect to obtain PPADhardness for -approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player games. Nevertheless, in Section 4 we show that a similar technique yields an interesting corollary for -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium in two-player games with incomplete information.
Corollary 1 ( -Bayesian Nash equilibrium). There exists a constant > 0, such that given a two-player game with incomplete information where each player has 14 actions, finding an -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
In two-player complete information games, Daskalakis [7] circumvents Lipton et al.'s quasi-polynomial time algorithm by studying a notion of relative (sometimes also called multiplicative [13] , as opposed to the more standard additive) -Nash equilibrium. Daskalakis proves that in two player games with payoffs in [−1, 1], finding a relative -Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete. One caveat of this result is that the gain from deviation is large compared to the expected payoff only because the latter is small due to cancellation of positive and negative payoffs. Namely, the gain from deviation may be very small compared to the expected magnitude of the payoff. Here we answer an open question from [7] by proving that finding a relative -Nash equilibrium continues to be PPAD-complete even when all the payoffs are positive.
Corollary 2 (Relative -Nash equilibrium).
There exists a constant > 0 such that finding a relative -Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game with positive payoffs is PPAD-complete.
The computation of Nash equilibrium is tightly related to computation of equilibrium in markets. In particular, Chen, Paparas, and Yannakakis [5] use a reduction from polymatrix games to prove PPAD-hardness for the computation of equilibrium for every family of utility functions from a very general class, which they call non-monotone families of utility functions. In Section 6 we prove the following hardness of approximation for market equilibrium.
Corollary 3 (Non-monotone markets). Let U be any non-monotone family of utility functions. There exists a constant U > 0 such that given a market M where the utility of each trader is either linear or taken from U, finding an U -tight approximate market equilibrium is PPAD-hard.
Although our inapproximability factor is stronger than that showed by Chen et al., the results are incomparable as we require tight approximate equilibrium, the more standard definition which bounds the two-sided error of the market equilibrium. Chen et al., in contrast, prove that even if we allow arbitrary excess supply, finding a (1/n)-approximate equilibrium is PPAD-hard. Furthermore, for the interesting case of CES utilities with parameter ρ < 0, they show that there exist markets where every (1/2)-tight equilibrium requires prices that are doubly-exponentially large (and thus require an exponential-size representation). Indeed, for a general non-monotone family U, the problem of computing a (tight or not) approximate equilibrium may not belong to PPAD. Nevertheless, the important family of additively separable, concave piecewise-linear utilities is known to satisfy the non-monotone condition [5] , and yet the computation of (exact) market equilibrium is in PPAD [27] . Therefore, Corollary 4 (SPLC markets). There exists a constant > 0, such that finding an -tight approximate market equilibrium with additively separable, concave piecewiselinear utilities is PPAD-complete.
En route to proving our main result, we also prove hardness of approximation for the generalized circuit problem. Generalized circuits are similar to standard algebraic circuits, the main difference being that generalized circuits contain cycles, which allow them to verify fixed points of continuous functions. A generalized circuit induces a constraint satisfaction problem, -Gcircuit [4] : find an assignment for the values on the lines of the circuit, that simultaneously -approximately satisfies all the constraints imposed by the gates (see Section 2.2). -Gcircuit was implicitly proven PPAD-complete for exponentially small by Daskalakis et al. [8] , and explicitly for polynomially small by Chen et al. [4] . Here we prove that it continues to be PPAD-complete for some constant .
Theorem 2 (Generalized circuit). There exists a constant > 0 such that -Gcircuit with fan-out 2 is PPADcomplete.
The -Gcircuit problem has already proven useful in several works in recent years (e.g [4, 7, 5, 19] ). We believe that Theorem 2 will lead to stronger hardness results in many applications in algorithmic game theory and economics. For example, competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) is a well-known fair allocation mechanism [10, 26, 25] ; however, for indivisible resources a CEEI may not exist. It was shown by Budish [2] that in the case of indivisible resources there is always an allocation, called A-CEEI, that is approximately fair, approximately truthful, and approximately efficient, for some favorable approximation parameters. This approximation is used in practice to assign business school students to classes [18] .
The approximation of CEEI is characterized by two parameters: α, which is a measure of the market clearing error, and β, which quantifies the inequality in initial endowments. Budish's proof guarantees the existence of an (α * , β)-CEEI for any β > 0 (and some parameter α * that depends on the input). Othman et al. [19] reduced Θ (β log (1/β))-Gcircuit with fan-out 2 to the problem of finding the guaranteed approximation, (α * , β)-CEEI. Theorem 2 now gives the following corollary:
Corollary 5 (A-CEEI). There exists a constant β > 0 such that finding an (α * , β)-CEEI is PPAD-complete.
Related works
This work extends our recent manuscript [21] , where we proved PPAD-hardness of -Nash equilibrium ( -NE) 1 , for constant and a constant number of actions per player, over a larger class of games called succinct games. Succinct games can have much more complex utilities than polymatrix or graphical games of bounded degree: any utility function that can be computed in polynomial time is allowed.
We improve over the results of [21] in three ways: (1) simplicity: our new hardness result holds for a much simpler and more natural definition of games; (2) -ANE vs -NE: thanks to the transformation to bounded degree graphical games our result extends to the weaker concept (thus stronger hardness) of -approximate Nash equilibrium (see e.g. [8] or our full version for precise definitions); and (3) completeness: finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in a bounded-degree graphical game is not only PPAD-hardit also belongs to PPAD [8] . For succinct games, in contrast, -NE is unlikely to belong to PPAD [22, Theorem 5.9]. On the technical side, our current construction of hard instances of Brouwer fixed points is identical to [21] . The main technical contribution in this paper is the adaptation of the equiangle sampling gadget of Chen et al. [4] to this particular Brouwer function.
Query complexity.
There are several interesting results on the query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria, where the algorithm is assumed to have black-box access to the exponential-size payoff function.
Hart and Nisan [12] prove that any deterministic algorithm needs to query at least an exponential number of queries to compute any -Nash equilibrium -and even for any -correlated equilibrium. For -correlated equilibrium, on the other hand, Hart and Nisan show a randomized algorithm that uses a number of queries polynomial in n and −1 .
Babichenko [1] recently showed that any randomized algorithm requires an exponential number of queries to find an -Nash equilibrium. Our proof is inspired by Babichenko's work and builds on some of his techniques.
Yet a newer paper by Goldberg and Roth [11] characterizes the query complexity of approximate coarse correlated equilibrium in games with many players. More important for our purpose is their polynomial upper bound on the query complexity of -Nash equilibria for any family of games that have any concise representation. This result is to be contrasted with (a) Babichenko's query complexity lower bound, which uses a larger family of games, and (b) [21] which applies exactly to this setting and gives a lower bound on the computational complexity.
A much older yet very interesting and closely related result is that of Hirsch, Papadimitriou, and Vavasis [14] . Hirsch et al. show that any deterministic algorithm for computing a Brouwer fixed point in the oracle model must make an exponential -in the dimension n and the approximationnumber of queries for values of the function. The techniques in [14] have proven particularly useful both in [1, 21] and here.
Approximation algorithm.
An algorithm for (1/2 + δ)-approximate Nash in any polymatrix game and for any constant δ > 0, was recently shown by Deligkas et al. [9] .
PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this paper we use the max-norm as the default measure of distance. In particular, when we say that f is M -Lipschitz we mean that for every x and y in the
A large part of our paper deals with approximate solutions to equations. We adopt the notation of writing x = y ± to imply that x ∈ (y − , y + ).
The EndOfTheLine problem
Our reduction starts from the EndOfTheLine problem. This problem was implicit in [20] , and explicitly defined by Daskalakis et al. [8] .
Definition 1. EndOfTheLine: ([8]) Given two circuits S and P , with n input bits and n output bits each, such that P (0 n ) = 0 n = S (0 n ), find an input x ∈ {0, 1} n such that P (S (x)) = x or S (P (x)) = x = 0 n . Theorem 3. (Essentially [20] ) EndOfTheLine is PPAD-complete (for poly-size S and P ).
The Hirsch et al. Brouwer function
In order to construct a hard instance of Brouwer function, we use techniques introduced by Hirsch, Papadimitriou, and Vavasis [14] . Hirsch et al. showed that the number of deterministic value-oracle queries required to find a Brouwer fixed point is exponential in the number of precision digits, the Lipschitz constant of the function, and -most important to us-the dimension of the domain. We reproduce here an overview of their construction, focusing on the details that will be used in our proof.
The continuous Brouwer function is denoted by f , while the associated displacement function is denoted by
The first dimension is special. All the action takes place in a designated (n − 1)-dimensional layer of subcubes that has the same values in the first coordinate; this layer is called the slice. Within the slice, we also ignore the subcubes that are near the boundary of the hypercube (those compose the frame); we are left with the subcubes in the center of the slice, which we call the picture.
In [14] , a single path is embedded inside the picture; this embedded path is called the tube. The home subcube, the subcube that corresponds to the beginning of the path, is special: all the flow from all subcubes that do not belong to the tube leads to this subcube. We mention that constructing this flow outside the picture is relatively simple, and ignore it for the rest of the paper.
Our instantiation
Notice that the EndOfTheLine graph is a disjoint union of directed paths and cycles. Thus instead of Hirsch et al.'s single path, we embed many paths and also cycles in the slice; instead of one tube, we now have many tubes. The home subcube continues to be special in the sense described above, and it is the starting point of one of our paths: it corresponds to the input 0 n in EndOfTheLine. It turns out that embedding many paths and cycles can be done rather naturally in this construction (see our full version or [21] ), and there is a one-to-one correspondence between fixed points of the modified Brouwer function and solutions to EndOfTheLine.
We also make a couple of changes in notation: It will be convenient to take the hypercube to be of dimension 2n + 2; and we let the special dimension be the last one, i.e. the (2n + 2)-th.
Finally we choose the subcube side length as long as possible. In particular, our picture contains 2 2n+1 subcubes.
Key properties
For the purpose of adapting this construction, the most important property is that most of the slice has the same default displacement: directly upwards, i.e. g (x) = δξ2n+2, where ξ2n+2 is the (2n + 2)-unit vector, and δ is some small parameter (constant in this paper). Formally,
for every x such that at least one of the following holds:
1. x lies on a corner, i.e. the intersection of two or more facets;
2.
x lies on an outer facet of a tube subcube, i.e. a facet other than the two facets that continue the path; or 3. x lies in a subcube that does not belong to any tube.
Intuitively, Property 2 implies that all subcubes -whether they belong to the tube or not-look the same from the outside (except for the two facets that continue the path). This essentially means that we are free to embed many paths and cycles in the slice. Property 1, stating that all corners look the same, is key to our modified construction, because it liberates us from having to disambiguate a position of a point near the corners (that is, from deciding exactly to which subcube it belongs). This is useful because those points that are close to corners, are precisely the ones that are hard to determine using "noisy" gates.
Finally, the following theorem summarizes the important parameters of f .
for every x that does not correspond to the endpoint of the path 3. The value of g at each point x depends only on whether the path passes through the subcube corresponding to x, and in which direction.
Max-norm Geometry
As we mentioned earlier, throughout this paper we work with the max-norm. This has some implications that may contradict our geometric intuition. For example: in a maxnorm world, a circle is a square.
Max-norm interpolation.
Given coordinates x, y ≥ 0, we define the max-norm angle 3 that point (x, y) forms with the X-axis as θmax (x, y) = y x+y .
The max-norm angle is useful for interpolation. Given the values of f on two neighboring facets of a subcube, we can extend f to all points of the subcube by angular interpolation: interpolate according to the max-norm angle θmax (xi, xj) where xi and xj are the respective distances from the two facets. When f is defined on two opposite facets, we can simply use Cartesian interpolation, which again means to interpolate according to the distance from each facet.
Max-norm local polar coordinates.
Given a point z ∈ R n we define a new local max-norm polar coordinate system around z. Every x ∈ R n is transformed into r, p z ∈ R × R n where r = x − z is the max-norm radius, and p = (x − z) /r is the max-norm unit vector that points from z in the direction of x.
Definition of g
Finally, we are ready to explicitly define the displacement function, g. The mapping is defined so that in the center of the tube, the flow goes along the direction of the path; slightly outside the center, the flow points towards the center of the tube; further away from the center, the flow goes against the direction of the path; at the outer boundary of the tube, as we previously described, the flows goes upwards.
We first define g on facets. Let r, p z be a point on the facet centered at z, and suppose that the tube enters the subcube through z, advancing in the positive i-th coordinate. We define
(Recall that h is the subcube side length, and δ is some small constant.) For r ∈ (0, h/8), interpolate between δξi and −δp ( [14] call this radial interpolation), and similarly for r ∈ (h/8, h/4) and r ∈ (h/4, h/2).
The home subcube is defined using (1) as if the tube enters from above, i.e. coming down the (2n + 2)-dimension, and exits through another facet (in one of the first (2n + 1) dimensions) in the direction of the path. For all other starting and end points, we define g (x) = δξ2n+2 on the facet opposite the one that continues the tube.
In the last couple of paragraphs we definied g on two facets for each subcube that belongs to the tubes; for all other points in the tubes we interpolate (either Cartesian or angular interpolation) between those two facets. Outside the tubes, g (x) = δξ2n+2.
This completes the definition of g inside the picture. Outside the picture, g is defined using similar ideas, and it does not depend on the EndOfTheLine instance at all. See our full version or [14] for details.
The -Gcircuit problem
Generalized circuits are similar to the standard algebraic circuits, the main difference being that generalized circuits contain cycles, which allow them to verify fixed points of continuous functions. We restrict the class of generalized circuits to include only a particular list of gates described below. Formally,
[Generalized circuits, [4] ] A generalized circuit S is a pair (V, T ), where V is a set of nodes and T is a collection of gates.
are the first and second input nodes of the gate; and v ∈ V is the output node.
The collection T of gates must satisfy the following important property: For every two gates
Alternatively, we can think of each gate as a constraint on the values on the incoming and outgoing wires. We are interested in the following constraint satisfaction problem: given a generalized circuit, find an assignment to all the wires that simultaneously satisfies all the gates. When every gate computes a continuous function of the incoming wires, a solution must exist by Brouwer's fixed point theorem.
In particular, we are interested in the approximate version of this CSP, where we must approximately satisfy every constraint.
Definition 3. Given a generalized circuit S = (V, T ), we say that an assignment x : V → [0, 1] -approximately satisfies S if for each of the following gates, x satisfies the corresponding constraints:
Given a generalized circuit S = (V, T ), -Gcircuit is the problem of finding an assignment that -approximately satisfies it.
Brittle comparators.
Intuitively, in order for (approximate) solutions to the circuit problem to correspond to (approximate) equilibria, all our gates should implement continuous (Lipschitz) functions. Comparing two inputs is not naturally a continuous function. To overcome this problem, Daskalakis et al. [8] defined the brittle comparator: when a is ( -) larger than b, it outputs 0; when b is ( -) larger than a, it outputs 1. However, when a and b are ( -approximately) equal, its behaviour is undefined.
Brittleness introduces difficulties in the transition from continuous to discrete solutions. This challenge is overcome by an averaging gadget, as described in Section 3.1.
PROOF OVERVIEW
In this section we outline the proof of our main result (Theorem 1). See the full version for details.
Our first step is to reduce EndOfTheLine to the problem of finding an approximate fixed point of a particular continuous function, inspired by the work of Hirsch et al. [14] (this reduction also recently appeared in [21] ). Roughly, we divide [0, 1] 2n+1 into subcubes of constant side length; this induces a graph over the subcubes, where two subcubes are adjacent if they share a facet. Notice that the EndOfTheLine graph consists of vertex-disjoint paths and cycles. We embed them as vertex-disjoint paths and cycles in the graph over the subcubes. Then, we think of our (2n+1)-dimensional hypercube as a slice inside a (2n + 2)-dimensional hypercube. Now, we use the techniques of [14] to define continuous function f : [0, 1] 2n+2 → [0, 1] 2n+2 along the new paths and cycles that has the following properties:
1. f is 80-Lipschitz;
2. f can be computed efficiently given the S and P circuits of the EndOfTheLine instance;
3. near the intersection of two or more subcube facets, f can be computed efficiently even without S and P ; 4. and every approximate fixed point of f corresponds to a valid solution to the EndOfTheLine instance.
In particular, the last property establishes the reduction from EndOfTheLine to finding an approximate fixed point of this function. Our second step is to reduce the problem of finding an approximate fixed point of this particular function to that of finding an approximate solution to a generalized circuit. Namely, we must show that that f (x) can be (approximately) computed, for every x ∈ [0, 1] 2n+2 , using the gates specified in the definition of -Gcircuit [4] . This is accomplished by parsing the subcube to which x belongs, implementing S and P , and an arithmetic calculation of the correct displacement. As we discuss below, the most challenging part is parsing the subcube when x is close to one or more facets. We overcome this by modifying the averaging gadget of Chen et al. [4] ; this modification exploits the fact that near two or more facets, we do not need to know to which subcube x belongs (Property 3).
In general, the above reduction may result in a generalized circuit of arbitrary fan-out. Chen et al. [4] do not explicitly discuss the fan-out of the generalized circuit gates (it is not needed for the reduction to two-player games), and Daskalakis et al. [8] achieve fan-out 2 by replacing gates with large fan-out with binary trees of G= gates. When the original fan-out is large, this technique amplifies the error by a logarithmic factor which we cannot afford. We overcome this issue by resorting to logical gates (in particular, G¬) that do not amplify error. Given a Boolean output of a logical gate, we can replace the large fan-out with a binary tree of G¬ gates (we use trees of even depth). Given a real output of an arithmetic gate, we convert it to unary representation using a constant number of (fan-out 2) G= and G< gates. Then we copy the unary representation using a binary tree of G¬ gates. Finally, we convert each copy back to a real number using a constant number of G ×ζ and G+ gates.
Our third and final step is to reduce the problem of finding an approximate solution to the generalized circuit to the problem of finding an approximate Nash equilibrium. This reduction follows directly from the game gadgets of Daskalakis et al. [8] . Each gadget simulates one of the -Gcircuit gates with a polymatrix game with a few players. This establishes the result for -NE. We complete the proof by pointing out that for bounded degree graphical games, finding an -NE reduces to finding a Θ 2 -ANE.
A simpler averaging gadget
Hirsch et al.'s Brouwer functions, as well as the ones used in previous PPAD-hardness results [8, 4] , partition the hypercube into subcubes, and define the function separately on each subcube. When we construct a circuit that approximately simulates such a Brouwer function, we have a problem near the facets of the subcubes: the approximate circuit's brittle comparators cannot determine to which subcube the input belongs.
Daskalakis et al. [8] tackle this challenge by introducing an averaging gadget: "sample" many points in the (max-norm) ball around the real input vector; compute the displacement for each translation, and average. They show that even if a few points are too close to facets, the vast majority of the points are sufficiently far. Thus on average, the output is approximately correct. This averaging also "smoothes" the function computed by the generalized circuit, which must be continuous.
Chen et al. [4] observe that when working in high dimension, sampling a ball requires exponentially many points. They overcome this problem via equiangle sampling: Instead of a ball around the input vector, consider many translations of the input vector by adding small multiples of the all-ones vector. Since each translation may be close to a facet in a different dimension, Chen et al. consider a polynomial number of translations. Thus, all translations must be polynomially close to each other -otherwise they will be too far to approximate the true input.
We avoid this problem by observing a nice property of the Hirsch et al. construction: when the input vector lies near two or more facets, the displacement is (approximately) the same, regardless of the subcube. Once we rule out such points, it suffices to sample only a constant number of points (as at most one of them may be too close to a facet). Intuitively, since the Hirsch et al. construction is already continuous and Lipschitz, it does not require much "smoothing". See also illustration in Figure 1 .
An alternative proof
There is a simpler and more intuitive reduction that gives somewhat weaker results, namely: PPAD-compeleteness for degree 3 graphical games with a constant number of actions per player.
The most arduous part in our proof is the second step, which takes us from the Hirsch et al. Brouwer function to a generalized circuit. In order to prove this reduction, we must design a circuit (or an algorithm) that implements the equiangle sampling and the Hirsch et al. Brouwer function using the limited set of gates allowed in Chen et al.'s definition of -Gcircuit. This part could be simplified using a more expressive set of gates.
A recent reduction that appeared in Eran Shmaya's blog [23] would essentially allow us to to replace the -Gcircuit gates with any gates of bounded fan-in and fan-out that compute c-Lipschitz functions for any constant c. We briefly sketch here this reduction from an arbitrary generalized circuit to a graphical game:
Each line in the circuit corresponds to a player, and we connect all players that share a common gate. The strategies of each player correspond to an O ( )-discretization of [0, 1]. When the player that corresponds to the output of gate G plays strategy b, and the input players play strategies a1 and a2, the utility to the output player is given by
It can be shown that in any O 2 -NE of this game, only the strategies closest to Ea 1 ,a 2 [G (a1, a2)] are played.
-APPROXIMATE BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we formally introduce and prove our corollary for -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium in twoplayer games with incomplete information.
In a game with incomplete information, each player i has a type ti known only to her, and the players' types t = (t1, t2) are drawn from a joint distribution which is known to everyone. The payoff for player i is a function ui (a, ti) of her own type and all the players' actions. Definition 4. (e.g. [24] ) In a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, for every player i and every type ti, the mixed strategy xi (ti) must be a best response in expectation over the other players' types and actions:
Similarly, in an -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium, for every player i and every type ti, the mixed strategy xi (ti) must be an -best response in expectation over the other players' types and actions:
Before we prove our main corollary for incomplete information games, it is helpful to prove the following slightly weaker statement, for two players with many strategies. Lemma 1. There exists a constant > 0, such that given a two-player game with incomplete information where each player has n actions, finding an -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
Proof. We reduce from a bipartite polymatrix game, and let the typeset for each of the two players in the incomplete information game correspond to one side of the bipartite graph. The utility of player i on edge (i, j) of the polymatrix game depends on her identity (i), as well as the identity (j) of the vertex on the other side of that edge. We use the types of the incomplete information game, to encode i. We encode j using the strategies of the second player in the incomplete information game.
In more detail, consider a bipartite polymatrix game for which it is PPAD-hard to compute a 4 -approximate Nash equilibrium. Use an affine transformation to change all the payoffs from [0, 1] to [1/2, 1] . It is PPAD-hard to find a 2approximate Nash equilibrium in the transformed game.
We now construct the two-player incomplete information game: As we hinted before, we let the typeset of each player correspond to the vertices on one side of the bipartite graphical game. Player i has |Ti| types and 2 |Ti| strategies, where each strategy corresponds to a pair of vertex and strategy for that vertex. If a player plays a strategy whose vertex does not match her type, her payoff is 0. Therefore in every -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium, every player, on every type, plays the two strategies that correspond to her type with probability at least 1 − 2 .
Let the joint distribution over types be as follows: pick a random edge in the bipartite graph, and assign the types corresponding to its vertices. Whenever both players play strategies that match their respective types, their payoffs are the payoffs in the (transformed) bimatrix game on that edge. In every -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium, every player, on every type, plays a mixed strategy which is -best response. Since the other player plays strategies that correspond to the correct vertex with probability at least 1 − 2 , the same mixture must be a 2 -best response for the vertex player in the bipartite game. x Chen et al. [4] x This paper A comparison of the averaging gadgets of [8] , [4] , and this paper. x is the point whose displacement we would like to estimate using imprecise gates and brittle comparators. Points that are too close to a facet between subcubes are denoted by triangles, while points that are sufficiently far are denoted by circles. Finally, in this paper we have a "safe" zone (shaded) around the corner where we don't need to parse the subcube; thus we only need to avoid one facet.
In order to prove the main corollary, we need to reduce the number of actions in the above construction. Observe that we don't need each player to choose an action that uniquely identifies her type. Rather, it suffices to specify which neighbor of the other player's vertex is chosen. This can be done concisely via a coloring of the vertices such that every pair of vertices of distance exactly two have different colors; i.e. a coloring of the square of the polymatrix game's graph. The squared graph has degree 3 · (3 − 1) = 6, and therefore we can efficiently find a 7-coloring. It suffices for each player to specify one of 7 colors, together with one of 2 strategies for the vertex with that color. Therefore we can encode this choice using only 14 strategies.
Corollary 1 ( -Bayesian Nash equilibrium).
There exists a constant > 0, such that given a two-player game with incomplete information where each player has 14 actions, finding an -approximate Bayesian Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
RELATIVE -NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we formally introduce and prove our result for relative -Nash equilibrium in two-player games.
Recall that a vector of mixed strategies x ∈ ×j∆Aj is a Nash equilibrium if every strategy ai in the support of xi is a best response to the actions of the mixed strategies of the rest of the players, x−i;
In this section, we study the multiplicative relaxation of this condition. Namely, Definition 5. We say that x is a relative -Nash equilibrium (relative -NE; sometimes also relative -well supported Nash equilibrium) if each ai in the support of xi is a relative -best response to x−i. I.e. ∀ai ∈ Supp (xi),
Corollary 2 (Relative -Nash equilibrium).
Proof. We reduce from a bipartite, degree 3, polymatrix game (Theorem 1). The payoff bimatrix is the sum of a main game that simulates the polymatrix game and an imitation game that forces the two players to randomize (approximately) uniformly across all the polymatrix game nodes.
Main game As in the reduction to games of incomplete information, let each player "control" the nodes on one side of the bipartite game graph. Namely, let n be the number nodes on each side of the graph; each player has 2n actions, each corresponding to a choice of a node and an action for that node. (We assume without loss of generality that the number of nodes is equal and every node has exactly 3 neighbors.) When the players play strategies that correspond to adjacent nodes in the graphs, they receive the payoffs of the corresponding nodes, scaled by a small positive constant, e.g. η = 0.01, to fit in [0, η]. If the nodes played do not share an edge in the bipartite game graph, the utility for both players is zero.
Imitation game We also let the players play a hide-andseek game with payoffs in {0, 1} over a space of n actions. Fix an arbitrary ordering over the nodes on each side of the polymatrix game; action i in the imitation game corresponds to the two rows (respectively, two columns) for node i in the main game. The row player tries to imitate the column player; namely her payoff is 1 if they both play their respective node i, and 0 otherwise. The column player tries to imitate the row player +1; her payoff is 1 if the row player plays node i, and she plays node i + 1 (mod n) (we henceforth drop the (mod n) for simplicity of notation).
Structure and value of a relative -NE
We first claim that in every relative -NE (x, y), the two players randomize approximately uniformly across all their nodes. Let x (i) denote the total probability that the row player assigns to node i, and analogously for y (i).
Lemma 2. In every (x, y) relative -NE, x (i) , y (i) ∈ [(1 − 4η) /n, (1 + 5η) /n] ∀i.
Proof. Let tR = maxi x (i) and i * R = arg maxi x (i); we first observe that if x (j) ≤ (1 − 4η) tR < (1 − − 3η) tR, then y (j + 1) = 0. The column player's payoff from the imitation game, when playing node j + 1, is at most x (j), while from the main game she can gain at most x (k) · η for each row player's node k in the neighborhood of the column player's j + 1. Since each node has only three neighbors and they all satisfy x (k) ≤ tR, her payoff for playing either strategy of node j + 1 is bounded by x (j) + 3tR · η < (1 − ) tR. However, she can guarantee a payoff of at least tR by playing node i * R ; therefore by the well-supported condition, y (j + 1) = 0. Similarly, if we let tC = maxi y (i), then whenever y (j) ≤ (1 − 4η) tC , x (j) = 0.
Next, we claim that both players have full support in the imitation game, i.e. x (i) , y (i) > 0 ∀i ∈ [n]. Assume by contradiction that this is false, and let, without loss of generality, x (i) = 0. Since x (i) < (1 − 4η) /n ≤ (1 − 4η) tR, we also have y (i + 1) = 0. However, this implies x (i + 1) = 0, which in turn implies y (i + 2) = 0, and so forth. By induction we get that x (i) , y (i) = 0 ∀i ∈ [n], which of course cannot be true as their sum is 1.
Therefore, for every i ∈ [n], we also have that
and similarly y (i) > (1 − 4η) /n. Finally, we claim that the maximum probability assigned to any node is at most tR, tC
Corollary 6. In every (x, y) relative -NE, the expected utilities of both players for playing any strategy is in [(1 − 4η) /n, (1 + 9η) /n].
Completing the proof of Corollary 2
Given a relative -NE (x, y), we can take, for each node i, the mixed strategy induced by the probabilities x (i : 1) /x (i) and x (i : 2) /x (i) that the row player assigns to each action (respectively, y (j : 1) /y (j) and y (j : 2) /y (j) assigned by the column player). We claim that this strategy profile is an -approximate equilibrium for the polymatrix game for some small constant = Θ ( ) (which is PPAD-hard to find by Theorem 1).
Assume by contradiction that this is not the case. Then without loss of generality there exists a node i which is controlled by the row player, and, under the induced strategy profile, can improve her payoff by by deviating from strategy 1 to strategy 2. Therefore in the two player game, the expected payoff to the row player from playing x (i : 2) is greater than the payoff from playing x (i : 1) by at least · η · 1 n · (1 − O (η)). (We multiply by the scaling factor η and the probability 1 n · (1 − O (η)) of observing any of its neighbors.) Yet, by Corollary 6 the total payoff from playing x (i : 2) is at most (1 + 9η) /n. Therefore, the row player improves her expected payoff by a factor of 1+Ω ( · η) ≥ 1+2 when deviating from x (i : 1) to x (i : 2) -but this contradicts our assumption that (x, y) is a relative -NE.
NON-MONOTONE MARKETS
In this section we formally introduce our result for nonmonotone markets, discuss it, and compare it to the original result of Chen, Paparas, and Yannakakis [5] .
Intuitively, a market is monotone if increasing the price of some good, while fixing the rest of the prices, never increases the excess demand for that good. Formally, we have the following definition by Chen et al.:
Definition 6. ( [5] ) Let M be a market with k ≥ 2 goods. We say that M is non-monotone at price vector π if there exist c > 0, and a good g1 such that:
• the excess demand Z1 (y1, . . . y k ) is a continuous function (rather than correspondence) over y ∈ B (π, c);
• Z1 (π) > 0;
• the partial derivative of ∂Z1/∂y1 exists and is continuous over B (π, c);
• and ∂Z1/∂y1 (π) > 0.
We say that a market M is non-monotone if there exists such a rational price vector π ≥ 0, and Z1 (π) is moderately computable; i.e. for any γ > 0, Z1 (π) can be approximated to within γ in time polynomial in 1/γ.
In general we want to talk about non-monotone families of utility functions, i.e. ones that support non-monotone markets. Formally,
We say that a family U of utility functions is non-monotone if:
. . x l k /b k ) for any indices l1, . . . , l k ∈ [m] and positive (rational) a, b1, . . . , b k ;
• u (x) = g * (xi) is in U for some strictly increasing g * : [0, ∞) → R; and
• there exists a non-monotone market MU with utilities from U.
We need to include one more definition: that of -tight market equilibrium.
Definition 8. A price vector π is an -tight approximate market equilibrium of M if there exists a z ∈ Z (π) (the excess demand at π) such that for every good j, |zj| ≤ Wj, where Wj is the sum of the endowments of good j.
Our main result for non-monotone market equilibria is now formally defined:
Why are non-monotone markets hard?
Before delving into the details of the construction, we attempt to reach some intuition: why should we expect equilibrium computation to be hard in non-monotone markets? Probably the most intuitive algorithm for finding market equilibrium is via tatonnement: raise the prices of over-demanded goods, and decrease the prices of underdemanded goods. For many markets, the tatonnement process is also computationally efficient [6] . One obvious problem is that when the market is non-monotone, the tatonnement step actually takes us further away from equilibrium. However, the non-monotonicity is only local: if we set the (relative) price of the non-monotone good high enough, even the most enthusiastic traders can only afford a small amount.
The "real" reason that tatonnement fails to converge efficiently for non-monotone markets is a little more subtle. What happens when the demand for the non-monotone good g increases by a factor of (1 + δ) for some small δ? The tatonnement increases the price of g, which further increases the demand. Eventually, the price is high enough, and the demand is reduced; but due to the non-monotonicity we may have to increase the price by larger factor, i.e. (1 + δ ) for δ > δ. Now, another trader with a positive endowment of g has increased her spending budget by (1 + δ ), further increasing the demand for yet another good (by a larger factor). Thus a small change in the demand for one good may cause a much larger change in the demand for another good. Exploiting this "butterfly effect" lies at the heart of Chen et al.'s construction.
High-level structure of the proof
Our reduction from polymatrix games to non-monotone markets closely follows the footsteps of [5] . To gain some intuition, consider two goods g2i−1 and g2i for each player i, corresponding to her two available strategies (soon each of those goods will become a subset of goods). Let π (g2i−1) and π (g2i) denote their corresponding prices; those prices correspond to the probabilities that player i assigns to her respective strategies. For every i, j ∈ [n], we add a trader who is interested in selling g2i−1 and buying g2j−1 (and similarly for (2i, 2j − 1), (2i − 1, 2j), and (2i, 2j)). This trader has an endowment of g2i−1 that is proportional to P2i−1,2j−1, the utility of player j in the bimatrix game with player i, when they both play the first strategy. Qualitatively, if the price π (g2i−1) is high (player i assigns a high probability to her first strategy), and P2i−1,2j−1 is high (player j receives a high utility from playing her first strategy to i's first strategy), then the demand for good g2j−1 is high -implying a high price in every approximate market equilibrium (i.e. player j indeed assigns a high probability to her first strategy).
In order to turn this qualitative intuition into a proof we use a more complex construction. The main difficulty comes from the need to amplify the effect of a higher income for one trader on the incomes of other traders. To this end we consider, for each i ∈ [n], two sequences of goods: g2i−1 = g2i−1,0, g2i−1,1, . . . , g2i−1,4t = h2i−1 and g2i = g2i,0, g2i,1, . . . , g2i,4t = h2i. The trader mentioned in the previous paragraph actually owns P2i−1,2j−1 units of good h2i−1; she is still interested in good g2j−1. Now we construct a chain of gadgets that use copies of the non-monotone markets in U to amplify the small gap guaranteed between π (g2j−1) and π (g2j) to a larger gap between π (h2j−1) and π (h2j).
Additionally, we want to bound the range that these prices may take; we accomplish that using a price regulating gadget [3, 27] to control the relative prices of π (g2i−1,j) and π (g2i,j). Then we show that the sums πi,j = π (g2i−1,j) + π (g2i,j) are approximately equal. Finally, we combine these lemmata to formalize a quantitative version of the qualitative intuition described above. (See [5] or our full version for details.)
Adaptations for constant hardness
As mentioned in the introduction, Corollary 3 has a weakness in comparison to the results of Chen et al. [5] : it only applies to tight approximate market equilibrium.
Maintaining the constant hardness of approximation through most of [5] 's proof is rather straightforward, but there are a few hurdles along the way. To understand the first obstacle, we must consider a subtle issue of normalization. Chen et al. normalize the bimatrix game between every pair of players to have an average value of 1/2. While this does not change the absolute utility gained from any deviation, the relative utility from deviation is now divided by a factor of Θ (n). In contrast, in Theorem 1 we prove hardness for a constant when normalizing with respect to a constant degree (3), i.e. each player participates in only a constant number of bimatrix games. We overcome this difficulty by using a different normalization: only edges (i.e. bimatrix games) that belong to the game graph will have an average utility of 1/2, while the utilities on other edges remains 0. Since we proved hardness for a degree 3 graphical game, the normalization only costs us a constant factor.
More serious complications arise when trying to prove [5] 's Lemma 3 4 for a constant . This lemma says that certain prices (in fact, these are sums of prices), denoted πi,0 for i ∈ [n], are approximately equal. A key step in the proof of [5] is to show, roughly, that in every (n)-approximate market equilibrium,
πj,0 − O ( (n)) When (n) is polynomially small, this immediately implies that min i∈[n] πi,0 is within O ( (n)) of the average, and therefore it must also be that max i∈[n] πi,0 is within O (n · (n)) of the average. When taking a larger (n), this reasoning breaks. The first modification we make to overcome this obstacle, is to require (n)-tight approximate market equilibrium. This gives a two-sided bound:
A second issue that arises in the same inequality, is that with our new normalization, which depends on the game graph G, we can only prove that πi,0 approximates the values of its neighbors, denoted NG (i). In other words, (3) becomes
In order to relate the value of πi,0 to the corresponding values of the neighboring vertices, πj,0's, we consider T consecutive applications of (4): πi,0 is O (T · )-close to the expectation over πj,0 where j is taken from the distribution of a T -steps random walk on G starting from i. For example, if G is a constant degree expander, the random walk converges in O (log n) steps, yielding a (1/ log n)-inapproximability result.
Achieving constant hardness
Finally, in order to achieve hardness for a constant , we want a graph with constant mixing time -and this clearly cannot be done with a constant degree. Instead, we construct a normalized game whose graph has a constant mixing time, each vertex has degree O ( √ n), and yet approximating Nash equilibrium is hard for a constant . In short, we take n copies of the original n-player game (our new game has n 2 players). For any pair of players that play a (non-trivial) bimatrix game in the original game, we have a copy of the same bimatrix game between all n 2 pairs of their respective copies. We also add a trivial bimatrix game between every pair of players that belong to the same copy of the original game. Finally, we argue that these newly added trivial edges are only a constant fraction of all edges in the new game graph, yet this graph has a constant mixing time.
(See full version for details.)
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